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Abstract 
 
The ability to monitor state behavior has become a critical tool of international 
governance. Systematic monitoring allows for the creation of numerical indicators that 
can be used to rank, compare and essentially censure states. This article argues that the 
ability to disseminate such numerical indicators widely and instantly constitutes an 
exercise of social power, with the potential to change important policy outputs. It 
explores this argument in the context of the United States’ efforts to combat trafficking in 
persons and find evidence that monitoring has important effects: countries are more likely 
to criminalize human trafficking when they are included in the US annual Trafficking in 
Persons Report, while countries that are placed on a “watch list” are also more likely to 
criminalize. These findings have broad implications for international governance and the 
exercise of soft power in the global information age. 
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International politics is essentially about how states attempt to influence one 
another’s policies in ways they believe will contribute to their security and welfare. As 
nations have become increasingly interdependent, the incentives to exert such influence 
have increased, even as the utility of military threats or material sanctions wanes. 
Consequently, social pressure is one of the primary tools of modern international 
relations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Simmons, et al. 2008). 
We focus on a form of social pressure that is increasingly common globally: 
performance indicators. Easily digestible quantitative ratings of state qualities, activities 
and policies have been used to measure everything from corruption to happiness. Recent 
research has documented 178 such indicators (Bandura 2008) and the list is growing 
rapidly. Indicators are hardly new – sovereign credit ratings first appeared in the 1930s – 
but the vast majority in use today were created after 1990 (Löwenheim 2008b). Their 
proliferation constitutes a profound social trend with implications for governance world-
wide (Espeland and Sauder 2007:2). 
This article argues that performance indicators can influence state policy outputs, 
especially when they are based on systematic monitoring, are comparative (and especially 
quantitative), are wielded by a respected actor or group/organization of actors, and are 
widely disseminated. The promulgation of such indicators is an exercise of what Joseph 
Nye (2004) calls “soft power,” and can be thought of as a form of informal governance 
(Davis, et al. 2012a). The act of ranking – even when unilateral – can have important 
political and policy consequences.  3 
 
The article is organized as follows. The first section theorizes the effects of 
monitoring and “indicizing” state behavior. These acts constitute an exercise of power, 
both because assembling such data requires resources and because their influence 
depends on the status of the creator. Rankings are an especially potent lever of social 
pressure because they simplify reality and foster explicit comparisons that, once 
promulgated, are difficult to dislodge from public discourse (Andreas and Greenhill 
2010).  
Section II introduces our empirical focus on United States (US) efforts to pressure 
other countries to fight human trafficking globally. These efforts present an excellent test 
case because they meet the theory’s scope conditions: for over a decade now, the US has 
disseminated country rankings throughout the world in the form of the annual Trafficking 
in Persons (“TIP”) Report.
1 Section III discusses the data and analytical approach, while 
Section IV presents the findings: the US has successfully used these rankings to spur 
other states to criminalize human trafficking in domestic law. Monitoring and ranking– 
even if not fully scientific, even if not multilaterally validated – are potentially powerful 
“governance” tools in international relations.  
 
I.  A Theory of Social Pressure: Monitoring, Indicizing, and Ranking  
 
Information as Tacit Social Pressure 
How states attempt to influence one another is the core question in international 
relations. Research has traditionally focused on material punishments and rewards 
                                                           
1 See: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.  4 
 
(Downs, et al. 1996), but a well-developed literature also argues state elites are 
susceptible to social pressures (Checkel 2001, Johnston 2001a). Shaming, or overtly 
singling out governments, and sometimes even individual leaders, for public opprobrium, 
is a tactic used by states, intergovernmental organizations (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 
Joachim, et al. 2008) and non-governmental actors (Risse and Sikkink 1999, Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2005). .  
An increasingly pervasive form of social pressure has developed over the past 
several years: the use of information gathered and deployed as indicators. Created by 
governmental, intergovernmental or private actors, indicators are “a named collection of 
rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different 
units” (Davis, et al. 2012a:6). They may represent a range of phenomena, from state 
qualities (“transparency”) to state policies (“press freedom”) to prevalent social practices 
(“corruption”). They tend to simplify a complex reality, attempt to appear objective, and 
serve to facilitate comparisons across units. 
The importance of performance information is of course not new in international 
relations. Rational functionalist theories highlight the informational function of 
international institutions (Keohane 1984), and recent studies emphasize that such 
information can be useful to domestic audiences for holding leaders accountable to 
international standards (Dai 2007, Kelley 2012). However, information is often used in a 
more normative and intentional way than these liberal theories of institutions imply: it is 
also deployed as a form of social pressure to alter state policies in preferred ways.  
The ability to apply social pressure – of which performance indicators are but one 
example – should not be thought of as a substitute for more traditional forms of state 5 
 
power. The two are integrally related. The nature and extent of that influence is 
inherently closely connected with the “status” of the pressuring state. Actors often attain 
their social status by virtue of their ability to control material resources, but this does not 
mean that status is isomorphic with traditional material measures of state power 
(Wohlforth 2009). It also depends on the respect and credibility accorded an actor, which 
in turn affects that actor’s social influence. For example, a “World Competitiveness 
Index” created by the Swiss
2 will carry different weight than a similar index would have 
if it were developed by Russians. This is not because the Swiss have tremendous coercive 
power; rather they have much higher credibility for the purposes of such a rating. 
Emphatically, performance indicators leverage power via credibility; they do not create 
power out of thin air. Nonetheless, resources are admittedly critical to the purposive 
deployment of information: they are required to gather, extract, analyze and propagate 
information on a global scale. Less concretely, “network power” may be critical in 
tapping informants and making sense of the data they provide. We therefore start from 
the assumption that information gathering is embedded in global power structures.  
Information is not neutral; it is powerful and its use is often purposive. Since 
powerful actors are most likely to be able to create influential bodies of knowledge, this 
capacity gives them additional influence over problem definition and agenda-setting 
(Keohane and Nye Jr 1998:86). This trend to use performance indicators to influence 
other states’ policies is likely fueled by several factors. Strong normative changes have 
                                                           
2 A Swiss NGO, the International Institute for Management Development, has created 
and disseminated such an indicator. See http://www.imd.org/news/World-
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seriously reduced states’ ability to use force to interfere in one another’s affairs, and 
especially in their domestic politics (Nardin 1983:269-70). Military coercion has become 
very costly, both politically and financially (Nye 1990). Economic interdependence also 
makes it harder to use levers such as sanctions to influence other states (Kim 2012). 
Meanwhile, the cost of exerting pressure via information has declined. While not 
costless, it has never been easier to collect and distribute reasonably credible information 
from highly decentralized sources on a global scale than it is today. Moreover, the 
indicization of information is a natural response to demands for transparency and 
accountability (Mathiason 2004). It is likely that the convergence of normative 
prohibitions against overt force and the ease of collecting, analyzing and disseminating 
information globally has encouraged the turn to indicators as tools of international 
influence. 
 
The Power of Monitoring 
Most performance indicators originate in some form of monitoring. Monitoring 
involves observing and checking the progress or quality of a policy, practice or condition 
over an extended period of time. It implies systematic review that is repeated, often even 
routinized. In experimental settings subjects behave differently when they know they are 
being watched. Referred to as the “Hawthorne effect,” individuals may re-arrange their 
priorities to meet external expectations when they are aware of being observed (Adair 
1984). Sociologists use the concept of reactivity – the tendency for people to change their 
behavior in response to being evaluated – to explain the effect, for example, of US News 
and World Report rankings on university priorities (Espeland and Sauder 2007). One 7 
 
reason may be that monitoring signals the social importance of specific tasks or values to 
the monitor and other actors (Larson and Callahan 1990). Some researchers stress that 
monitoring is especially effective in impersonal settings where its “disciplining” function 
outweighs its tendency to undercut personal trust relationships (Frey 1993).  
Monitoring has long been theorized as a potent form of social control (Foucault 
1995:201-02). Its power lies in its latent potential to shame those who are revealed to 
“underperform.” When it is regularized and ongoing, targets may internalize the regime 
and potentially self-regulate. When a monitoring regime is applied generally to like units, 
rather than on an ad hoc basis it may gain acceptance if not legitimacy by undercutting 
claims that the monitors have singled out specific targets “unfairly” (Löwenheim 2008a). 
As described further below, there are good reasons to expect monitoring to influence both 
individual policymakers and organizational routines. 
 
The Power of Indicators 
Once established, monitoring systems constitute governing spaces over which 
monitors can wield considerable influence. This is especially the case when the exercise 
produces concise and comparable rankings or ratings (Hansen 2011:508, Buthe 2012). 
Numerical indicators are simple, and readily serve as ‘psychological rules of thumb,’ 
precisely because they reduce complexity (Sinclair 2005:52). A column of numbers can 
be scanned in seconds, while reading the underlying reports on which they are based 
(which may or may not be translated into the local language) could take weeks (Espeland 
and Stevens 1998:316, Löwenheim 2008b:257-58). Most importantly, numbers facilitate 
comparisons among units and over time. They can also be averaged, thereby helping to 8 
 
establish “norms” or “standards” against which it becomes straightforward to compare 
different units (Weisband 2000). For these reasons, actors respond differently to ratings 
than to words alone (Robson 1992, Hansen and Mühlen-Schulte 2012:457). 
The starkest form of ranking is “blacklisting.” Entities placed on a blacklist are 
deemed especially poor performers and may even be denied some benefit or privilege by 
the broader community. Being on a “watch list” is similar, though slightly less 
stigmatizing. Watch lists are social devices created not only to collect more information 
(for example, Interpol’s terrorism watch list); like blacklists, they may trigger social 
sanctions (e.g., of firms suspected of insider trading),
3 or at least shame actors who 
violate community standards. Blacklists and watch lists are quite influential because they 
exploit negative social information that has especially strong “attention grabbing power” 
(Pratto and John 1991).  
Blacklists and watch lists abound internationally. Greenpeace, for example, 
publicizes a blacklist of fishing operations it deems “irresponsible” and urges consumers 
to boycott their products. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has long maintained a 
blacklist of non-cooperative jurisdictions in the fight against money laundering. The US 
publishes a watch list for violations of intellectual property rights, which not only shames 
but also triggers “out of cycle reviews…to encourage progress of IPR issues of 
concern.”
4 In short, a blacklist or watch list constitutes a ‘bright line’ engineered to 
distinguish actors that are performing to social expectations from those that are not.  
                                                           
3 See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/watch list.asp#axzz24BH2gFh7.  
4 US Trade Representative, Special 301 Trade Report, p. 6; 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf.  9 
 
 
Mechanisms Linking International Monitoring, Indicators and State Policy 
Change 
How are these insights about monitoring and performance indicators connected to 
state behavioral or policy change? Indicators can affect policy outcomes through several 
distinct mechanisms. Figure 1 illustrates the general argument.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms: indicators and policy change 
 
First, performance indicators can influence policymakers to the extent that they 
influence domestic politics. Higher rankings in a domestically salient policy area such as 
human rights or environmental protection can help to attract or retain domestic political 
support (Dai 2007). Salient, negative rankings potentially mobilize domestic political 10 
 
actors (NGOs, economic actors) who in turn press decision makers for behavioral or 
legislative change (Simmons 2009). This mechanism does not necessarily depend on 
external material power, although some groups may mobilize to protect an economic 
stake that could be threatened by an external sanction. Mobilization can strengthen vocal 
domestic political coalitions who are inspired or incensed enough by the rating to demand 
official attention to the matter. Such demands can in some cases raise the costs of not 
responding for politicians. Even the anticipation of publicity and negative domestic 
reactions could in some cases prompt preemptive policy review by government officials. 
Second, performance indicators can work through direct peer shaming. Indicators 
sometimes target policies for which specific government officials are directly 
responsible. Ratings and rankings can therefore have a bearing on the personal status of 
an individual (e.g., government minister) or that of a collectivity such as a department or 
bureaucracy (Kelley 2013). When rankings reflect poorly, this person or policy body may 
seek to avoid opprobrium by introducing policy changes before the next “grading 
period.” This mechanism can work independently of the material power of the rater; what 
is critical is the subjective regard of the rated for the rater and the need or desire to 
maintain a good professional reputation. The ability of the indicator to trigger localized or 
transnational blame around the responsible individual or bureaucracy can also matter. 
Officials may initiate policy change to deflect criticism that could damage their personal 
or professional reputations. 
Sometimes monitoring and ranking may even influence ongoing bureaucratic 
operations and capacities. Monitoring may elicit compliance activity and stimulate 
information-gathering. External monitors may prompt bureaucrats to comb through 11 
 
records, assign employees data collection tasks, and forge connections with private actors 
who may have useful information. Some researchers have argued that the “collection, 
processing and dissemination of information” itself shapes the cognitive framework of 
policy-making (Bogdandy and Goldmann 2008:242). More strategically, bureaucrats are 
adept at learning what it takes to improve their state’s ratings by consulting the bank of 
“approved” policy advice that monitoring summaries sometimes contain (Cialdini 2012). 
Teasing out whether monitoring primarily affects bureaucratic operating procedures or 
involves individual cognitive remapping (or both) is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
both suggest monitoring and performance indicators are likely to influence both 
individuals and organizational routines.  
Third, indicators may impact policy by activating transnational pressure. Most 
notably, indicators may influence market expectations. Even if the rater does not have 
direct control of material resources, indicators can influence policymakers in the target 
state if they contain market or other relevant information to which private economic 
agents respond. Credit rating agencies for example control minimal material resources of 
their own, but their ratings can touch off a tsunami in capital or exchange rate markets. 
Indeed, states may be concerned that ratings are linked; for example, credit rating 
agencies may be influenced by other indicators such as Transparency International’s 
“corruption” index (Mellios and Paget-Blanc 2006).
5 An indicator produced by one entity 
may also inspire third parties to apply additional pressure on a particular target. For 
example, the US uses many indicators in its assessment of whether countries qualify for 
                                                           
5 This study does not document the effect of TI ratings on credit ratings, but uses the 
former as a predictor of the latter. 12 
 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funds.
6 A rater therefore need not have 
significant material power for the indicator to change the incentives of policymakers in a 
target country, although their assessments would need to have enough credibility to be 
taken seriously by the market or other actors.  
Through each of these mechanisms, the performance indicator may have a 
“multiplier effect,” raising the target’s perceived risk that undesired behavior might have 
political, reputational or material consequences. These consequences likely vary by issue 
area. Money laundering black lists may work through transnational market pressures, but 
human trafficking ratings may work through the mobilization of domestic NGOs. A 
particular ministry or minister may be especially impacted by indicators in his or her 
bailiwick; the World Wildlife Fund’s “ecological footprint index” might be a particular 
embarrassment for Ministers of the Environment, for example. Even when fairly tightly 
coupled with the material power of the rater, the added value of social pressure via 
indicators resides in their ability to signal community displeasure to the target and to 
stimulate a policy response. It is also important to recognize that positive ratings may 
stimulate efforts at “status maintenance,” or efforts to maintain good ratings. Either way, 
indicators can be used by powerful actors, to paraphrase Kofi Annan, to amplify the 
effect of their own moral, institutional, and material resources (Annan 1998:129). Prima 
facie evidence of their influence can be found in their contestation (Hansen and Mühlen-
                                                           
6  The MCC aids countries on the basis of 17 indicators generated by third parties, from 
IGOs (e.g., UNESCO) to NGOs (e.g., Freedom House) to universities (e.g., 
Columbia/Yale), and aids only those who score above the median.  See 
http://www.mcc.gov//pages/selection/indicators.  13 
 
Schulte 2012:458). The fact that ratings are cited, discussed, and sometimes excoriated 
indicates their power to draw attention and to set the terms of the policy debate. 
To summarize, indicators are exercises in social power that interact with the status 
of the ranker in the broader international community. They can mobilize and inform 
domestic actors, embarrass specific policy makers, and sometimes even activate other 
transnational pressure and move markets. Powerful rankers, such as the United States, 
seem well aware of the possibilities, expending resources to collect reasonably credible 
information. That they increasingly choose to do so is revealing in itself, since the entire 
monitoring machinery is difficult to explain if powerful states could simply threaten 
others bilaterally if they do not cooperate.  
 
Monitoring, Scope Conditions, and the Case of Human Trafficking 
In an age of information overload not all performance indicators exert the same 
degree of social pressure. Source matters. In psychology, “social impact theory” 
emphasizes the importance to the target of the actor or group of actors engaging in 
pressure, the nature and extent of the target’s exposure to the group, and, to some extent, 
the size of the group attempting to enforce conformity (Latané 1981). Social pressures in 
international relations can be exercised by highly respected or hegemonic state actors, 
through international organizations (Johnston 2001b, Bearce and Bondanella 2007) or 
non-state actors. The higher the monitor’s status the more focal the information is likely 
to become, raising its perceived validity and reducing its deniability among a broad range 
of actors.  14 
 
Information should also be expected to exert more social pressure when it is 
imbued with normative significance, especially when it conveys a bright line between 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. As argued above, social pressure increases when 
information is comparative. Such information may even change basic power relationships 
and have effects akin to regulation (Buthe 2012, Davis, et al. 2012b:72).  
These scope conditions may hold in a broad range of cases, from the World 
Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” rankings to the United Nations’ “Gender 
Empowerment Measure.” To illustrating the theory, this article examines the area of 
human trafficking. Increasingly, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations 
as well as individual states collect information on the nature and extent of human 
trafficking world-wide. New technologies from global positioning to web-based reporting 
platforms are increasingly deployed to detect trafficking, to aggregate country profiles, 
and to disseminate assessments of government efforts to counter trafficking (Latonero 
2012). This information is being funneled via local governments, non-governmental 
organizations and law enforcement to United States embassy staff around the world, who 
in turn vet and collate it for the US State Department’s highly visible Trafficking in 
Persons Report (TIP Report), published annually since 2001. 
Human trafficking therefore fits the scope conditions of the theory. Furthermore, 
it is imbued with normative salience, there are a range of possible policy responses, and 
no reason to think criminalization on the US model is the best or only policy response. In 
fact when the United States first started monitoring, fewer than 10 percent of states had 
criminalized human trafficking in their domestic law. Now approximately 70 per cent of 15 
 
all countries have done so (Lloyd, et al. 2012). The following section discusses human 
trafficking and US policies to reduce it world-wide. 
 
II.  The human trafficking problem and US policies  
Human trafficking is the trade in human beings or organs for any purpose, but 
generally for labor or sexual exploitation.
7 The issue has gained attention since the 
nineties and become an industry estimated at over $31 billion annually (Besler 2005). 
The adoption in 2000 of the Human Trafficking Protocol to the Transnational Organized 
Crime Convention – as of the autumn of 2013, ratified by some 157 states
8 – testifies to 
the growing international concern about human trafficking. The convention requires 
parties to criminalize human trafficking and encourages them to develop and implement 
national action plans to identify and protect victims, arrest traffickers, create trans-border 
cooperation and so on.  
The US has played a central role in combatting human trafficking (Efrat 2012). 
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 authorized the 
State Department to push for anti-trafficking policies around the world and to monitor 
and rate other countries’ performance. Since 2004 these ratings have been tied to access 
                                                           
7 See the Human Trafficking Protocol (2000), Article 3(a) at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffic.htm.  
8 For up to date ratification status see 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-
a&chapter=18&lang=en 16 
 
to US foreign aid, although due to a combination of waivers and existing sanctions, they 
have rarely resulted in sanctions.  
Core to this program is the annual TIP Report, which assesses governments’ 
efforts to combat trafficking and protect its victims. The report, released each summer 
since 2001 with great fanfare, uses country narratives accompanied by three “Tier 
ratings,” with Tier 1 being the best (18% of country-years) and Tier 3 the worst (about 
11% of country-years). The modal rating has been Tier 2, which has been given half the 
time. The State Department added a “watch list” in 2004, often considered “Tier 2.5,” 
and has placed countries on this list about 21% of the time. Countries on the watch list or 
Tier 3 are determined by the State Department to have a serious trafficking problem 
without taking adequate measures to address it, clearly falling below a bright line of 
socially unacceptable behavior. With a total of 1,345 annual country ratings since 
inception, this reporting system is a good opportunity to examine the effect of monitoring 
and indicators on state trafficking policies. The 2001 report rated 79 countries. Until 2009 
inclusion depended on the availability of what the US deems reliable information that 
trafficking in a specific country is “significant,” defined as exceeding 100 cases.
9  Recent 
reports render almost universal coverage. (See Supplementary Information, item 4.2.) 
Allies as well as adversaries are subject to scrutiny and appear at all three tier levels. 
The tier rankings are hardly scientific (United States 2006, Wooditch 2011) and 
may well miss selective compliance maneuvers by states. Even so, it is recognized as “the 
                                                           
9 For the criteria for inclusion on the watch list see the Introduction of the 2004 Report, at 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/34021.htm.  17 
 
most influential and the most trusted indicator of states’ performance vis-à-vis human 
trafficking” (Zaloznaya and Hagan 2012:18)..  
There are numerous reasons to think that the TIP Report and tier ratings exert 
social pressure on rated states. The United States’ global position enables it to exert 
social pressure that other countries apparently experience in a variety of ways. For 
example, responding to Honduras’s 2004 Tier 2 rating, a Honduran newspaper, El 
Heraldo, called on the government to improve its policies “not only because we may lose 
some of the cooperation we get from the U.S. but because it's their legal and moral 
obligation.”
10 The US actively publicizes its TIP reports, and a very high or very low 
rating increases the likelihood that a country will be named in a major news article that 
also mentions human trafficking (Figure 1). News coverage of a country in the Lexis-
Nexis database in conjunction with reference to human trafficking increases significantly 
if the country was included in the TIP Report in the previous year, controlling for 
population, wealth, democracy, ratification of the UN TIP protocol, and country and year 
fixed effects.
11 The United States’ TIP Report is a primary source of information for 
organizations such as the United Nations and the International Organization for 
Migration.
12 Evidence at many different levels suggests that the TIP Report enhances 
scrutiny both in domestic and international policy circles, plausibly creating pressure on 
politicians to address the problem.  
                                                           
10 See http://dazzlepod.com/cable/04TEGUCIGALPA1384/?rss=1. 
11 Results available in the supplementary information, item 2. 
12 See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-
persons.html.  18 
 
 
Source: Lexis-Nexis database.  
NOTE: Years 1999 and 2000 are based on countries' rating/ status in 2001. 
 
Ongoing US monitoring, channeled through US embassies abroad, has stimulated 
information producing networks among ministries of foreign affairs, prosecutors’ offices, 
border police, and a broad array of non-governmental organizations. Indeed, before the 
State Department began monitoring, most governments did not gather or would not share 
information on human trafficking systematically (Laczko 2002, Lee 2005). The annual 
information gathering stimulated by the US report thus raises the awareness and 
knowledge of the issue and engages local actors. Alongside the narrative reports, the TIP 
monitoring and rating system has the potential to mobilize domestic groups to demand 
and stimulate state bureaucracies to supply attention to the problem of human trafficking. 
For these reasons, we hypothesize that countries included in the US reporting 
regime will strengthen their laws on human trafficking to a greater extent than countries 
not included in the monitoring regime. We also hypothesize that countries rated at a 
lower tier will move to correct their policies, and that they will make an effort to do so 
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Figure 1:  Media Coverage of Human Trafficking in countries rated 
and unrated by the annual United States’ Trafficking in Persons 
Report 
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particularly after they are placed on or below the watch list. This leads us to posit three 
major hypotheses. The first relates purely to monitoring: 
 
Scrutiny Hypothesis: Inclusion in a report makes compliant behavior 
more likely. Specifically, countries included in the US reporting system 
will be more likely to criminalize than countries not included in the 
reporting system. 
 
The second relates to the power of socially constructed thresholds to alter 
behavior: 
 
Bright line hypothesis: Explicit categories of social shame induce more 
compliant behavior. Specifically, countries placed on the watch list or Tier 
3 will be more likely to criminalize than those ranked Tier 2 or above. 
 
The third relates to the first time effects of watch listing a country, or what we 
refer to as “social demotion:” 
 
Demotion hypotheses: The first clear instance of shaming positively 
affects compliance behavior. Specifically, countries that have been 
recently demoted to the watch list or below will be more likely to 
criminalize than other countries.  
 
 20 
 
III.  Empirical approach  
The analysis proceeds in three stages. First we analyze inclusion in the TIP report 
as well as determinants of shaming. These are important in considering selection issues, 
which influence the strength of any conclusions about monitoring and rating. For 
example, if the United States strategically monitors or shames states that are likely to 
criminalize human trafficking anyway, the analysis will over-estimate the effects of 
monitoring and rankings on policy. We therefore begin with a cox proportional hazards 
model of determinants of time to inclusion in the report, followed by a probit analysis of 
determinants of the likelihood of shaming – that is, the likelihood that the US places a 
country on the watch list or Tier 3.  
The main analysis examines the effect of monitoring and ranking on state 
behavior. As discussed further below, the dependent variable is criminalization of human 
trafficking in domestic law. Because this is a unidirectional event that occurs only once 
per country in the dataset, a cox proportional hazards model is used to analyze how 
various factors influence the probability that a country will criminalize, given that it has 
not already done so. All explanatory and control variables are lagged to help address 
reverse causality and selection issues. Even though the statistical analysis cannot 
establish causality definitely its purpose is to establish plausibility of the claim that 
international actors can use ratings and reporting to influence other state’s policy. The 
data are global and include the years 2000-2011. 
The Dependent Variable: 
The US supports a wide range of anti-trafficking policies. We have chosen a 
relatively objective dependent variable to represent compliant behavior, namely whether 21 
 
countries criminalize human trafficking in their domestic legislation. Criminalization is 
one of the main tenets of the 2000 UN human trafficking protocol.
13 It is widely viewed 
as necessary, though not sufficient, for greater anti-trafficking efforts (Gallagher 
2001:980) and is one of the foremost goals of US policy.
14 Some research suggests that 
stringent law enforcement efforts in fact do reduce the likelihood of human trafficking 
corridors between states (Frank and Simmons 2013). Legislative change in a country’s 
penal code is often a significant endeavor. Many democracies have cumbersome 
legislative processes where politicians may want to prioritize other matters. In other 
cases, criminalization is resisted by cultural practices that tolerate domestic servitude or 
underpaid or bonded child labor. In some countries, local officials benefit directly and 
indirectly from trafficking, which can further increase resistance to criminalization. 
While it is clearly not as difficult to pass a law as to enforce it, the former often enables 
the latter. Moreover, criminalization may raise expectations of greater law enforcement 
efforts, which may be politically difficult for some governments to ignore.  
Legislative responses to the demand for criminalization may take various forms. 
Consistent with the US Department of State’s expectations, a country is classified as 
having fully criminalized when it prohibits all forms of human trafficking, including sex 
                                                           
13 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Article V Paragraphs 1 and 2. Text at 
http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%
20traff_eng.pdf.  
14 See policy statement by the Department of Justice at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/human_trafficking.htm.  22 
 
and labor trafficking of men, women and children, and when the domestic law prescribes 
minimum sentences of 3-5 years. Sources include the UN global report on trafficking, US 
TIP reports, and domestic legislation from the International Organization of Migration 
(IOM) database. The dependent variable indicates the status of criminalization in the 
twelve-month period prior to the release of the TIP report. 
Explanatory Variables 
Several variables capture social pressure. In Report is an indicator that denotes 
whether a country is rated in the report at all and therefore captures “scrutiny.” Tier 
denotes the country’s rating: whether 1, 2, 3 or placed on the Watch list. These indicators 
capture the degree of shaming, with Tier 1 countries being praised for full compliance. A 
binary indicator of Shaming, defined as placement of a country either on the watch list or 
Tier 3, is also used. First demotion is an indicator equal to 1 in a year that a country is 
placed either on the watch list, or rated a Tier 3 (without first having been on the watch 
list) for the first time. We also include some measures of US material power that may be 
very relevant to the specific rated state. The most direct pressure point in the context of 
human trafficking is aid assistance. We use primarily log of US aid, but also US aid as 
share of GDP. As an additional check, the target country’s trade with US as a share of 
GDP is also used. 
Throughout the analysis a number of other variables are used as controls. All are 
described further in the supplementary materials (item 1). Intensity of the trafficking 
problem in countries of origin, transit and destination countries was generated based on 
the 2006 UN Trafficking in Persons report and is a constant for all years, Missing 
information measures the availability of information on trafficking, which may influence 23 
 
the ability of the US to include a country in the report in the first place. It is a count of 
how often a country has missing information on ten types of data in a given year, 
including seven unrelated to trafficking. We also created a variable to capture human 
trafficking NGO density, based on the number or NGO mentions in the US TIP reports, 
extended backwards to all years, creating a constant measure for almost all countries 
included in the analysis. Finally, regional density of criminalization measures the 
proportion of countries within a country’s region that had criminalized as of the previous 
year. Other variables include civil liberties from Freedom House, an indicator of 2000 
TIP protocol ratification, total population (logged) as well as measures of a country’s 
bureaucratic quality, rule of law, corruption, or the share of women holding seats in 
parliament. All sources and measurement details are listed in the supplementary materials 
(item 1).  
IV.  Findings 
Preliminaries: Inclusion in the report and shaming 
As discussed, the TIP report methodology section is fairly explicit about inclusion 
criteria: There must be sufficient information and evidence of at least 100 cases of 
trafficking reported. Table 1 supports this informational explanation of the data 
generation process, using a Cox proportionate hazard model to estimate time to inclusion 
in the report. Missing information, and the estimated intensity of the trafficking problem 
in countries of origin, transit and destination are the factors most robustly associated with 
inclusion in the TIP Report. Few other factors explain inclusion. As Table 1 shows, 
countries with worse civil liberties are also likely to be included. The level of NGO 
density and total population (logged) are only occasionally significant. Additional testing, 24 
 
shown in the supplementary materials (item 3.1), reveals no correlation for other factors 
that might influence both criminalization and monitoring: inclusion in the TIP Report is 
not correlated with trade with US as a share of GDP, log of US aid, US aid as share of 
GDP, or a country’s wealth (log of GPD per capita). Nor is it influenced by a country’s 
bureaucratic quality, rule of law, corruption, or the share of women holding seats in 
parliament. In sum, as the US itself acknowledges, missing information (negatively) and 
trafficking intensity (positively) are the factors that drive selection into monitoring. 
Strategic monitoring based on the likelihood of criminalization or special political or 
economic relationships finds no support.  
 
Table 1: 
Time to a country’s inclusion in the annual US Trafficking in Persons Report 
Table 1: Cox duration models of time to inclusion in report, Hazard Ratios 
  Model 1.1   Model 1.2  Model 1.3 
Total population (logged)  1.172** 
(0.0758) 
1.076 
(0.0714) 
1.011 
(0.0559) 
Missing information   0.736*** 
(0.0374) 
0.738*** 
(0.0380) 
0.831*** 
(0.0592) 
NGO density    1.086* 
(0.0481) 
1.064 
(0.0442) 
Worse civil liberties    1.096** 
(0.0504) 
1.103* 
(0.0558) 
Regional density of criminalization    2.101 
(1.027) 
1.359 
(0.641) 
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification    0.944 
(0.177) 
1.064 
(0.207) 
Trafficking intensity in countries of origin      1.100* 
(0.0595) 
Trafficking intensity in transit countries      1.133*** 
(0.0545) 
Trafficking intensity in destination countries      1.184*** 
(0.0747) 
Observations  663  493  384 
Number of countries  179  146  146 
Number of criminalizations  169  161  145 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 25 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged one period unless 
otherwise noted. All models satisfy the proportional hazards assumption.  
 
Does the U.S. strategically shame countries that are likely to criminalize anyway? 
This is important for understanding selection issues, but in practice this is quite 
implausible; indeed it could be counter-productive to embarrass those on the verge of 
improving on their own. While the US did apparently drop Jordan to the watch list to 
pressure officials to speed up the long-lingering process of criminalization, there is no 
general pattern of manipulating ratings prior to criminalization. For example, Austria and 
Australia both entered the report in 2004 as a Tier 1 and stayed there until they 
criminalized fully in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Chile also entered in 2004 as a Tier 2 
and stayed there although it did not criminalize until 2011. The idea that the rating 
reflects the immediate anticipation of criminalization seems unfounded.  
Nor is there any systematic statistical evidence that the US strategically shames 
easy-to-influence states. Table 2 displays the results of several probit models designed to 
predict shaming, defined as either watch list or Tier 3 status. Some factors that might also 
explain criminalization do correlate with shaming. States are more likely to be shamed 
the more US aid (logged) they get, the larger their GDP (logged), the smaller their total 
population (logged), the greater their TIP-related NGOs density, and if they have ratified 
the 2000 TIP protocol. Supplementary models (items 3.2 and 3.3) also find that 
trafficking intensity in origin, transit and destination countries is sometimes associated 
with shaming.  
On the other hand, some factors that drive shaming seem to work in the opposite 
direction of what would favor criminalization: Countries are more likely to be shamed the 26 
 
less democratic they are, the more corrupt they are and the lower their rule of law. Lastly, 
a number of other variables that might affect criminalization were not associated with 
shaming, such as regional density of criminalization, US trade share of GDP, missing 
information, and bureaucratic quality. (See Supplementary Information item 3.3, which 
show the results hold when restricting the sample to countries that have not criminalized.) 
Overall, there is practically no systematic evidence that the US merely criticizes countries 
that would have criminalized anyway.  
 
Table 2: Correlates of Shaming in annual US Trafficking in Persons Reports 
Logit model; odds ratios reported 
  Full sample 
  Model 2.1  Model 2.2 
Civil Liberties  1.720***  1.766*** 
(0.094)  (0.102) 
US aid logged  1.063***  1.069*** 
(0.017)  (0.017) 
GDP (logged)  1.637***  1.540*** 
(0.117)  (0.109) 
Total population 
(logged) 
0.607***  0.643*** 
(0.050)  (0.053) 
2000 TIP 
Protocol 
Ratification 
2.606***  2.636*** 
(0.353)  (0.359) 
NGO density  1.188***  1.194*** 
(0.058)  (0.059) 
Corruption   0.568***   
(0.081)   
Rule of Law    0.698** 
  (0.099) 
Constant  0.000***  0.001*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  1,846  1,846 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged one period.  
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In short: states that are monitored and shamed with poor ratings are not easy cases 
ripe for criminalization. Monitored states are those about which the US is likely to have 
more information and with a worse trafficking problem than other states, but they are not 
more democratic, or richer or otherwise better placed to criminalize trafficking. Those 
shamed are likely to have worse civil liberties, corruption and rule of law, receive more 
US aid, all factors which would likely weigh against criminalization. They are more 
likely to have ratified the 2000 TIP protocol, and have more NGOs concerned with 
human trafficking, so in the following section, these potentially confounding conditions 
are taken into account.  
 
Main analysis: criminalization 
The analysis of criminalization generally supports the hypotheses. Table 3 first 
examines the scrutiny hypotheses by looking at the effect of being in the report both with 
and without interacting this variable with measures of US material pressures. Model 3.1 
is included only to show that the trafficking incidence variables are not significant in 
predicting criminalization.
15 The rest of the models in Table 3 all show considerable 
support for the scrutiny hypothesis. Models 3.2 and 3.3 show that compared to countries 
not in the report, included states are about 3.6 to 3.9 times more likely to criminalize 
human trafficking in any given year. Other factors also matter. Countries are more likely 
                                                           
15 Further analysis shows the models in both Table 3 and 4 do not satisfy the non-
proportional hazard assumption when these incidence variables are included, so we do 
not interpret the explanatory variables in these models, and leave these variables out of 
the remainder of the models in Table 3 and 4. 28 
 
to criminalize the greater the share of women in parliament, the greater their civil 
liberties, the greater the regional density of criminalization and if they have ratified the 
2000 TIP protocol. Interestingly, US aid in itself appears to have little effect on 
criminalization.  
Models 3.4 and 3.5 examine how the scrutiny in the reports interacts with US aid, 
measured either as the US aid (logged) or US aid as share of GDP. We also test the 
relationship for trade as share of GDP (not shown). Model 3.4 interacts log of aid with 
scrutiny. The interaction term has a p-value of .103, suggesting that scrutiny may indeed 
magnify the ability of the US to use aid effectively. However, scrutiny encourages 
criminalization even among countries that receive no US aid, while aid in the absence of 
scrutiny has little effect on criminalization. 
 Perhaps the expectation of US aid, rather than the possible loss of it, leads 
countries to criminalize. As shown in the supplementary materials (item 3.5), there is no 
evidence that countries that criminalize receive any additional aid. Criminalization does 
not appear to be a function of aid expectations (see also Wooditch 2011). In sum, scrutiny 
of human trafficking policies may have enhanced the pressure of US foreign assistance 
from the United States, engendering results that aid alone has not been able to achieve.  
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Table 3: The relationship between scrutiny, aid and criminalization 
Cox duration models of time to criminalization, Hazard Ratios 
  Model 
3.1 
Model 3.2  Model 3.3  Model 
3.4 
Model 
3.5 
In Report  5.706***  3.609***  3.897***  2.208*  3.437*** 
(3.387)  (1.218)  (1.289)  (1.052)  (1.205) 
Share of Women in Parliament 
  
1.019**  1.020**  1.016**  1.015**  1.016** 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Civil Liberties  0.888  0.900  0.867**  0.864**  0.843*** 
(0.080)  (0.083)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.049) 
Regional density of 
criminalization  
4.576***  3.110**  4.048***  4.399***  4.453*** 
(2.486)  (1.601)  (1.886)  (2.095)  (2.053) 
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification 
 
1.872**  1.787**  1.927***  1.888***  1.810*** 
(0.460)  (0.442)  (0.438)  (0.432)  (0.398) 
Missing Information (t-2)  1.192  1.154  1.192**  1.202**  1.212** 
(0.143)  (0.115)  (0.091)  (0.093)   (0.093) 
Trafficking intensity in 
countries of origin 
0.956         
(0.085)         
Trafficking intensity in transit 
countries 
1.146         
(0.123)         
Trafficking intensity in 
destination countries 
0.964         
(0.104)         
Total population (logged)    0.951       
  (0.076)       
NGO density    1.116       
  (0.082)       
GDP per cap (logged)    1.105       
  (0.119)       
Corruption    1.008       
  (0.203)       
US Aid (logged)      0.978  0.937**   
    (0.015)  (0.029)   
US Aid (logged)* In Report        1.057   
      (0.036)   
US aid as share of GDP          0.988 
          (0.012) 
US aid as share of GDP * In 
Report 
        1.012 
        (0.013) 
Observations  1,251  1,307  1,392  1,392  1,373 
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -400.5  -433.6  -467.4  -466.3  -457.7 
Subjects  144  157  160  160  158 
Failures  95  99  107  107  105 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged one period unless 
otherwise noted. All models meet the proportional hazard assumption except Model 3.1. See fn. 
15. Note: we also check the last two models by using trade as share of GDP and its interaction 
with being in report. The findings, not reported, are similar to model 3.5. 
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Table 4 examines the shaming and demotion hypotheses. Model 4.1 first includes 
the variables that were significant in predicting shaming. Several variables such as civil 
liberties, regional density of criminalization, women in parliament and 2000 TIP protocol 
ratification increase the likelihood of criminalization in the expected direction. 
Interestingly, whereas countries with worse civil liberties are more likely to be shamed, 
they are less likely to criminalize. Apparently more repressive regimes are among the 
most resistant to policy change. Several variables that were important in predicting 
shaming (e.g., variables capturing trafficking incidence) were not important in predicting 
criminalization.  
Models 4.2 and 4.3 test for the effect of actual tier rankings. In both models, being 
shamed matters: countries below the bright line (on the watch list or ranked as Tier 3) are 
most likely to criminalize. Their likelihood of criminalization is higher than those 
countries not in the report, and in the case of Tier 3 countries, also higher than countries 
rated Tier 1. The coefficients on Tier 3 and Tier 1 are statistically different from one 
another in both models. However, as models 4.2 and 4.3 show, even countries rated Tier 
1 are more likely to criminalize than countries not in the report at all, suggesting that 
these countries, although not shamed in the traditional sense, may be concerned with 
status maintenance. Tier 1 countries are 2.6 to 3.4 times more likely to criminalize in any 
given year than those not in the report. The coefficients on Tier 2 and watch list are also 
statistically different from each other, suggesting that the watch list constitutes a clear 
bright line that goes well beyond the milder criticism of being placed on the second tier. 
Finally, Model 4.4 examines the demotion hypothesis. A first-time drop appears 
to galvanize legislative action within two to three years, and, by year 3, doubles the 31 
 
likelihood of criminalization in any given year. The demotion models are robust to all the 
control variables discussed above and to the domestic variables found significant in the 
scrutiny model. 
Overall, the observed relationship between monitoring, rating and criminalization 
does not appear to be explained by the variables that drive report coverage or ratings in 
the first place. Rather, it appears that countries react strongly to scrutiny, rankings and in 
particular falling below a certain socially acceptable threshold.  
 
Table 4: The relationships between ranking, shaming and criminalization 
 
 
Model 4.1  Model 
4.2 
Model 4.3    Model 4.4 
Tier 1  4.575**  2.628**  3.420***  In Report  3.331*** 
(2.713)  (1.155)  (1.348)  (1.140) 
Tier 2  2.517*  1.654  1.884*  First demotion 
(t-3) 
2.127** 
(1.225)  (0.566)  (0.613)  (0.640) 
Watch List  7.324***  4.587***  4.870***  First demotion 
(t-2) 
1.676* 
(3.587)  (1.615)  (1.630)  (0.478) 
Tier 3  10.575***  8.235***  7.211***  First demotion 
(t-1) 
1.259 
(5.300)  (2.867)  (2.455)  (0.334) 
Share of Women in 
Parliament 
1.022**  1.022***  1.020**    1.021*** 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)    (0.008) 
Civil Liberties  0.795**  0.814**  0.796***    0.820*** 
(0.076)  (0.077)  (0.052)    (0.048) 
Regional density of 
criminalization 
4.318***  3.742**  4.110***    4.756*** 
(2.319)  (2.019)  (1.968)    (2.130) 
2000 TIP Protocol 
Ratification 
1.848**  1.965***  1.859***    1.643** 
(0.484)  (0.491)  (0.421)    (0.370) 
Missing information  1.143  1.044  1.141*    1.194** 
(0.130)  (0.104)  (0.084)    (0.091) 
Trafficking intensity in 
countries of origin 
1.029         
(0.092)         
Trafficking intensity in 
transit countries 
1.116         
(0.119)         
Trafficking intensity in 
destination countries 
0.924         
(0.098)         
Total population (logged)    0.961       
  (0.084)       
NGO density    1.082       
  (0.077)       32 
 
US Aid (logged)    0.969       
  (0.023)       
GPD per capita (logged)    0.905       
  (0.109)       
Corruption    1.101       
  (0.247)       
Observations  1,251  1,307  1,392    1,392 
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -391.5  -422.9  -458.8    -464.9 
Subjects  144  157  160    160 
Failures  95  99  107    107 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged one period unless 
otherwise noted. All models meet the proportional hazard assumption except Model 4.1. See 
fn.15. 
 
Robustness checks 
The association of monitoring and ranking with criminalization cannot easily be 
attributed to other factors. The results cannot be explained by ratification of the 2000 
human trafficking protocol, which is controlled in the tables above. Chronologically, 
states are more likely to ratify the protocol after they enter the report than before. It is 
possible, however, that the US is simply good at selecting countries that intended to ratify 
the protocol and criminalize, and that this intent is really driving criminalization patterns. 
To check for this possibility or other factors related to the early years of the report, the 
first four years of the report were excluded from the analysis so that early ratifiers do not 
bias the analysis. The main results still hold. Although the ratification of the protocol is 
associated with criminalization, this is unlikely to account fully for the positive 
relationship between inclusion in the TIP report and criminalization. We also ran models 
for scrutiny and shaming excluding countries that are consistently rated either Tier 1 or 
Tier 3 throughout the reporting years, making the test as close as we can to a regression 
discontinuity design without being privy to discussions about which Tier 2 countries 
came closest to being bumped down to the watch list. The main results hold. Finally, the 33 
 
European Union (EU) has been another prominent actor in fighting human trafficking. It 
has been active in pushing for ratification of the UN protocol and its members are also 
obligated to criminalize under various EU directives. It could therefore be that EU 
countries drive the results. All EU countries were removed from the sample; the main 
results are robust to this exclusion (Supplementary Materials, item 3.6). 
 
V.  Conclusion 
For international actors seeking to wield influence in interstate relations, 
information is a potentially powerful policy tool, especially when it takes the form of 
easy-to-understand rankings or ratings. Similar to the sociological concept of reactivity, 
once decision makers realize that they are being monitored they may change their 
priorities to meet external expectations. Monitoring can also be facilitative: it spurs 
information gathering and disseminates information on what it takes to garner social 
approval. Finally, when monitoring produces comparable numerical indicators, it can 
stimulate competitive status concerns domestically and internationally and enhance 
shaming by drawing a bright line under socially acceptable behavior. Such bright lines 
can stimulate domestic mobilization around an issue, raising demands for policy change. 
They can also shame individual ministers or ministries. Government officials react 
strongly to negative performance indicators in their areas of responsibility. Pakistan’s 
Interior Ministry provides striking evidence of the power of falling below a socially 
acceptable bright line. According to a 2008 press release from the Ministry: “[T]he 
United States State Department had previously ranked Pakistan on Tier-2 Watchlist 
which was a cause of concern for the country. With significant efforts of Ministry of 34 
 
Interior ...[]... under the supervision of Rehman Malik, Minister for Interior, the US has 
upgraded Pakistan's ranking. This development has improved the stature of Pakistan 
before the world.”
16 Not only do government officials dislike low ratings, they respond 
positively to them, and then take credit, sometimes publicly, for improving their grade.  
This paper is one of the first to offer cross-national systematic analysis of the use 
and performance of indicators as social pressure in interstate relations. The case of the 
US global policy on trafficking in persons provides some initial evidence that 
governments respond to the scrutiny that comes from inclusion in a monitoring scheme. It 
appears that states are sensitive to monitoring, respond faster to harsher “grades,” and 
react when their grade first drops below a socially significant threshold. Confidence in 
the findings is bolstered by the ability to rule out several alternative explanations.  
This research augments our knowledge of international politics by exploring the 
subtle processes of establishing and promulgating indicators of status and respectability. 
Moreover, this research goes beyond the well-known phenomenon of “naming and 
shaming” to suggest the critical role of monitoring itself as a way of wielding power. 
Given the growing role of information technology worldwide, the need to understand the 
effects of monitoring takes on added urgency. Combined with indicization, such 
performance information has a potentially powerful impact on state policies.  
                                                           
16 Associated Press of Pakistan. "Upgradation of Pakistan on human trafficking list a 
significant achievement." June 28, 2012. Available at 
http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107655&It
emid=2. Accessed December 2, 2013. 
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  Although the evidence supports the powerful influence of monitoring and 
ranking, more research is needed. How does the proliferation of rankings from various 
sources influence their effectiveness? Does it matter whether rankings are produced 
multilaterally rather than unilaterally, or by private actors rather than public ones? Does 
monitoring and rating matter in issue areas less imbued with normative significance than 
is the case of human trafficking? Do numbers consistently have more influence than 
narratives alone? Future research should explore scope conditions for the influence of 
monitoring and ranking schemes. To date, rating schemes by respected actors have 
mostly been used as dependent variables; these findings suggest the value of a research 
program that converts them into explanatory variables and looks for their impact on 
specific policy innovations.  
  Research along these lines will greatly increase our knowledge of “soft power” 
that underlies modern global governance. It should also spark further inquiry into the 
incentives of actors to collect and propagate such information in the first place, as well as 
the strategies actors employ to enhance perceptions of the ‘authoritative’ quality of the 
information they produce. In terms of practice, more knowledge of alternatives to the 
traditional policy tools of coercion and direct intervention in other states’ affairs would 
be welcomed by those charged with formulating and executing foreign policy. The 
evidence presented here is a beginning.  
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1. DATA TABLE 
 
Name  Description  Source 
Full 
Criminalization 
The complete prohibition of all forms of 
human trafficking, including sex and labor 
trafficking for men and women, children and 
adults. Penalties must be significant, usually 
meaning minimum sentences of 3-5 years. 
Note that, because the US trafficking report 
comes out annually in June, to avoid 
sequencing errors in our inference, a country 
is coded as having fully criminalized in a 
given year only if it had done so prior to the 
issuance of the report in June. Dates usually 
refer to the actual enactment of the 
legislation, but in cases where that 
information is not available, the month of 
passage of the legislation is used. If no date 
could be established, the country was coded 
as having fully criminalized that year 
(equivalent to an assumption that it 
criminalized before the report came out, thus 
biasing any systematic error against a finding 
of an effect of the report on criminalization). 
 
UN global report on 
trafficking, 2009. US 
TIP reports, 
domestic legislation 
from the 
International 
Organization of 
Migration (IOM) 
database and other 
sources. 
In Report  Dichotomous variable indicating whether a 
country is included in the report. 
US TIP Report 
Tier 1  Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating 
whether the US has rated a country as Tier 1, 
which means that the US has assessed it to 
fully comply with the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards. 
US TIP Report 
Tier 2  Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating 
whether the US has rated a country as Tier 2, 
which means that the US has assessed that it 
does not fully comply with the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum 
standards, but is making efforts to do so. 
US TIP Report 
Watch list  Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating 
whether the US has placed a country on the 
Tier 2 watch list, which means that it may 
drop to Tier 3 the following year. 
US TIP Report 
Tier 3  Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating 
whether the US has rated a country as Tier 3, 
which means the US has assessed that it does 
US TIP Report 43 
 
not fully comply with the minimum standards 
and is not making significant efforts to do so. 
Shaming  Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating 
whether the US has rated a country as Tier 3 
or placed it on the watch list 
US TIP Report 
First Demotion  Dichotomous variable (0/1) coded 1 in a year 
that a country is placed either on the watch 
list or rated a Tier 3 (without first having been 
on the watch list) for the first time. 
US TIP Report 
Sanctions (used 
supplementary 
testing only) 
Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating 
whether a country received any sanction that 
was not subsequently waived by the US 
president according to Section 110 (d) of the 
United States Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000. 
Annual US 
presidential 
statements, TIP 
report 
US Aid  The log of Total Aid from the United States 
constant 2010 $US. We add 1 before taking 
the log so that the value for no aid is 0. 
US Overseas Loans 
& Grants 
[Greenbook] 
Civil Liberties  Freedom House Civil Liberties; 1 to 7 scale, 
with 1 representing the best civil liberties and 
7 the worst. 
Freedom House, 
http://www.freedom
house.org/reports 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
Ranging from 0-4, with 4 indicating the 
highest quality 
The International 
Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), 
www.prsgroup.com 
Share of women 
in parliament 
Share of voting seats in the lower house of 
national parliaments held by women (% of 
total seats), as of the last day of the listed 
year. 
Women in National 
Parliaments, 
statistical archive. 
http://www.ipu.org/
wmn-e/classif-
arc.htm, accessed 
February 2012. 
Trafficking 
intensity in 
(destination/origi
n/transit) 
countries 
Incidence of reporting of trafficking persons 
in (destination/origin/transit) countries. 
1=very low; 2=low; 3=medium; 4=high; 
5=very high. 
2006 UNODC TIP 
report, Appendix 5-
Incidence of 
reporting of 
(destination/origin/tr
ansit) countries. The 
incidence from the 
2006 report is 
extended to all years 
in the analysis. 
Regional density 
of 
criminalization 
A measure capturing the percent of countries 
in a region that have criminalized trafficking 
Generated based on 
the criminalization 
variable 
GPD (logged)  GDP in current US dollars  World Bank 44 
 
Indicators 
GPD per capital 
(logged) 
GPD/ Total Population (logged) in current US 
dollars 
World Bank 
Indicators 
Corruption  Variable ranging from  
-1.7 to 2.4 
World Bank 
Indicators 
Rule of Law  Variable ranging from  
-2.2 to 2.0 
World Bank 
Indicators 
Total Population 
(logged) 
The log of total population  World Bank 
Indicators 
2000 TIP 
Protocol 
Ratification 
An indicator (0/1) for whether a country has 
ratified the UN Palermo Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime 
United Nations 
website 
NGO density  A count of number of total times the annual 
US State Department TIP report for a given 
country mentions the word NGO, divided by 
the number of reports in the data. Thus, it 
captures average number of NGO mentions 
per report for a given country and it is a 
constant for each country. The data is 
extended backwards to years before a country 
was included in the report. 
TIP report, variable 
generated by authors 
IGO density 
(used 
supplementary 
testing only) 
Analogous to NGO density, only counting 
mentions of the following specific IGOs: ILO, 
IOM, OSCE, UNICEF, Council of Europe, 
UNHCR, UNIFEM and UNDP 
TIP report, variable 
generated by authors 
Missing 
Information 
A count of number of variables for which 
information is missing in a given year for: 
Freedom House civil liberties, the 
International Country Risk Guide corruption 
score, Erik Voeten’s UN Affinity voting data, 
and four variables from the World Bank: Net 
ODA, Intentional homicides, Health 
expenditures, and GDP. The variable also 
counts the three variables from the UN 
incidence data on TIP, adding a one for each 
of these variables where the UN did not find 
any information. 
Author generated 
based on included 
variables and their 
sources 45 
 
2. MEDIA COVERAGE 
To examine media coverage we created the following additional variables 
Coverage: the log of the number of times a country’s name will appear in a news story in 
the Lexis-Nexis database within 50 words of the phrase “human trafficking” (or a close 
cognate) 
In report: an indicator equal 1 when a country is included in the report (or Unrated 
reversed) 
Change in coverage: the change in Lnstory from year t-1 to year t. 
First year in report: an indicator for the first year a country is in a report 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Change in coverage  Coverage  Coverage 
First year in report  0.219***    -0.0437 
  (0.0564)    (0.0657) 
In report    0.497***  0.516*** 
    (0.0572)  (0.0695) 
Coverage (lagged)  -0.752***  0.192***  0.188*** 
  (0.0238)  (0.0240)  (0.0247) 
Freedom House political rights (lagged)  0.0378  0.0440  0.0387 
  (0.0314)  (0.0306)  (0.0309) 
GDP per capita (logged and lagged)  0.308*  0.335**  0.325** 
  (0.168)  (0.161)  (0.165) 
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification  0.102*  0.0344  0.0384 
  (0.0524)  (0.0509)  (0.0522) 
Total Population (logged and lagged)  2.970***  2.969***  3.034*** 
  (0.376)  (0.366)  (0.369) 
Constant  -47.52***  -46.81***  -48.59*** 
  (6.337)  (6.202)  (6.226) 
       
Observations  1,664  1,690  1,664 
R-squared  0.486  0.702  0.698 
Number of cowcode  174  174  174 
All models have country and year fixed effects  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The analysis here is suggestive. There are outliers and the relationships depend on 
logging the dependent variable. That said, Model 1 captures the effect of being included 
in the report. That is the first year bump. Model 2 captures just the effect of being in the 
report generally. Model 3 combines them suggesting there is a smaller gain in the first 
year and then stronger thereafter. 46 
 
3. SUPPLEMENTARY TESTING  
3.1 Robustness tests for table 1: Time to Inclusion 
Cox duration models of time to inclusion in report, Hazard Ratios 
Total population (logged)  1.177**  1.259***  1.166**  1.096  1.140**  1.169**  1.085  1.193***  1.193*** 
  (0.078)  (0.061)  (0.073)  (0.067)  (0.060)  (0.078)  (0.067)  (0.075)  (0.074) 
Missing Information   0.742***  0.746***  0.741***  0.719***  0.775***  0.738***  0.738***  0.723***  0.723*** 
  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Share of Women in 
Parliament 
0.998                 
  (0.006)                 
Share of Trade w/ the US    0.540               
    (0.238)               
US Aid (logged)      1.013             
      (0.012)             
IGO density        1.014           
        (0.073)           
Criminalization          0.939         
          (0.200)         
GPD per capita (logged)            0.946       
            (0.053)       
Bureaucratic Quality              0.971     
              (0.069)     
Rule of law                0.959   
                (0.085)   
Corruption                  0.952 
                  (0.079) 
Observations  646  550  663  575  504  638  361  647  647 
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -706.0  -666.5  -734.5  -721.7  -689.5  -721.7  -547.5  -715.6  -715.6 
subjects  174  165  179  171  163  175  134  179  179 
failures  164  157  169  169  161  167  132  163  163 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Standard errors in parentheses. All variables lagged by one year unless otherwise noted 47 
 
3.2.  Robustness tests for Table 2: Selection into Shaming, Full Sample 
Logit models, odd ratios 
  With corruption  With rule of law 
Civil Liberties  1.850***  1.994***  1.796***  1.927***  2.072***  1.857*** 
  (0.120)  (0.160)  (0.130)  (0.126)  (0.169)  (0.137) 
US Aid (logged)  1.092***  1.090***  1.067***  1.095***  1.096***  1.076*** 
  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.021) 
GDP (logged)  1.585***  1.693***    1.475***  1.590***   
  (0.130)  (0.185)    (0.115)  (0.166)   
Total population (logged)  0.611***  0.565***  0.974  0.645***  0.605***  0.989 
  (0.056)  (0.068)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.070)  (0.059) 
2000 TIP Protocol 
Ratification 
2.809***  3.553***  3.010***  2.888***  3.621***  3.003*** 
  (0.421)  (0.718)  (0.556)  (0.434)  (0.736)  (0.557) 
NGO density  1.261***  1.372***  1.231***  1.265***  1.398***  1.249*** 
  (0.069)  (0.091)  (0.075)  (0.069)  (0.093)  (0.077) 
Corruption  0.577***  0.613**  0.454***       
  (0.093)  (0.133)  (0.092)       
Rule of law        0.716**  0.823  0.667** 
        (0.114)  (0.172)  (0.125) 
Missing Information  0.887  0.955  1.124*  0.861*  0.935  1.098 
  (0.070)  (0.095)  (0.079)  (0.067)  (0.093)  (0.077) 
US trade as share of GDP    0.432  0.462    0.498  0.569 
    (0.360)  (0.356)    (0.417)  (0.436) 
Share of Women in 
Parliament 
  0.989  0.989    0.987  0.985* 
    (0.010)  (0.009)    (0.010)  (0.009) 
Bureaucratic Quality    0.885  1.125    0.816  1.028 
    (0.133)  (0.156)    (0.123)  (0.145) 
Regional density of 
criminalization 
  0.892  0.951    0.920  1.027 
    (0.361)  (0.351)    (0.370)  (0.375) 48 
 
Trafficking intensity in 
countries of origin 
0.850**  0.940    0.865**  0.955   
  (0.060)  (0.082)    (0.062)  (0.085)   
Trafficking intensity in 
transit countries 
0.843***  0.821***    0.833***  0.807***   
  (0.053)  (0.062)    (0.053)  (0.061)   
Trafficking intensity in 
destination countries 
1.217***  1.291***    1.248***  1.319***   
  (0.080)  (0.100)    (0.081)  (0.101)   
GPD per capita (logged)      1.757***      1.592*** 
      (0.175)      (0.151) 
Constant  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  1,592  1,266  1,355  1,592  1,266  1,355 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses 
All variables lagged by one year unless otherwise noted 
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3.3.  Robustness tests for Table 2: Selection into Shaming, Sample limited to countries that have not yet 
criminalized 
Logit models, odd ratios 
  With corruption  With rule of law 
Civil Liberties  1.999***  2.191***  1.939***  1.986***  2.191***  1.940*** 
  (0.150)  (0.203)  (0.162)  (0.151)  (0.208)  (0.166) 
US Aid (logged)  1.112***  1.109***  1.088***  1.110***  1.110***  1.091*** 
  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
GDP (logged)  1.619***  1.786***    1.608***  1.726***   
  (0.150)  (0.224)    (0.143)  (0.207)   
Total population (logged)  0.633***  0.562***  1.010  0.638***  0.584***  1.028 
  (0.066)  (0.078)  (0.071)  (0.065)  (0.078)  (0.072) 
2000 TIP Protocol 
Ratification 
4.170***  4.779***  3.910***  4.175***  4.797***  3.883*** 
  (0.758)  (1.110)  (0.821)  (0.758)  (1.118)  (0.819) 
NGO density  1.355***  1.436***  1.300***  1.353***  1.439***  1.301*** 
  (0.083)  (0.108)  (0.090)  (0.083)  (0.109)  (0.091) 
Corruption  0.767  0.688  0.525***       
  (0.138)  (0.167)  (0.121)       
Rule of law        0.756  0.749  0.642** 
        (0.135)  (0.179)  (0.141) 
Missing Information  0.964  1.081  1.224**  0.953  1.065  1.199** 
  (0.086)  (0.123)  (0.102)  (0.084)  (0.121)  (0.101) 
US trade as share of GDP    0.474  0.247    0.467  0.250 
    (0.431)  (0.213)    (0.429)  (0.218) 
Share of Women in 
Parliament 
  1.001  0.993    0.999  0.989 
    (0.011)  (0.010)    (0.011)  (0.011) 
Bureaucratic Quality    0.937  1.140    0.918  1.090 
    (0.163)  (0.191)    (0.162)  (0.185) 
Regional density of    1.696  2.223*    1.718  2.297* 50 
 
criminalization 
    (0.869)  (1.049)    (0.880)  (1.080) 
Trafficking intensity in 
countries of origin 
0.789***  0.830*    0.783***  0.824*   
  (0.064)  (0.084)    (0.064)  (0.085)   
Trafficking intensity in 
transit countries 
0.935  0.939    0.940  0.937   
  (0.071)  (0.082)    (0.071)  (0.083)   
Trafficking intensity in 
destination countries 
1.224***  1.232**    1.242***  1.255**   
  (0.093)  (0.110)    (0.093)  (0.111)   
GPD per capita (logged)      1.965***      1.858*** 
      (0.223)      (0.203) 
Constant  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  1.999***  2.191***  1.939***  1.986***  2.191***  1.940*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses 
All variables lagged by one year unless otherwise noted 
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3.4.  Robustness tests for table 3: scrutiny and shaming 
Cox duration models of time to criminalization, Hazard Ratios 
  Excludes EU 
countries 
Excludes 
years before 
2004 
Excludes 
years before 
2005 
Excludes 
countries 
always Tier 1 
or Tier 3 
Excludes EU 
countries 
Excludes 
years before 
2004 
Excludes 
years before 
2005 
Excludes 
countries 
always Tier 1 
or Tier 3 
In Report  4.351***  4.556***  3.720***  4.339***         
  (1.678)  (1.7678)  (1.459)  (1.643)         
Tier 1          5.222***  4.381***  3.154**  2.800** 
          (2.632)  (2.091)  (1.587)  (1.360) 
Tier 2          1.914*  2.391**  1.978  2.120** 
          (0.670)  (0.991)  (0.831)  (0.733) 
Watch List          5.147***  6.212***  4.942***  5.278*** 
          (1.881)  (2.618)  (2.040)  (1.885) 
Tier 3          7.399***  9.482***  7.528***  9.029*** 
          (2.684)  (4.307)  (3.415)  (3.264) 
Share of Women in 
Parliament 
1.018**  1.016**  1.016*  1.015*  1.020**  1.020**  1.021**  1.025*** 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Civil Liberties  0.836***  0.878**  0.902  0.884**  0.796***  0.823***  0.837**  0.829*** 
  (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.054) 
Regional density of 
criminalization 
8.743***  4.686***  4.207***  4.389***  8.078***  4.231***  3.982***  4.541*** 
  (5.028)  (2.066)  (1.842)  (1.984)  (4.191)  (2.009)  (1.893)  (2.140) 
2000 TIP Protocol 
Ratification 
2.102***  1.554**  1.755**  1.794**  2.273***  1.651**  1.833**  1.762** 
  (0.523)  (0.338)  (0.410)  (0.407)  (0.584)  (0.388)  (0.460)  (0.405) 
Missing Information (t-2)  1.241***  1.251***  1.277***  1.228***  1.163*  1.185**  1.220**  1.150* 
  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.107)  (0.095)  (0.092)  (0.094)  (0.100)  (0.087) 
Observations  1,291  793  656  1,306  1,291  793  656  1,306 
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -379.9  -366.2  -336.0  -415.8  -370.6  -357.1  -328.2  -406.5 
subjects  146  138  131  146  146  138  131  146 
failures  89  85  78  96  89  85  78  96 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses. All variables lagged by one year unless otherwise noted 52 
 
3.5.  Does Criminalization cause aid? 
  No country fixed effects, but 
clustered 
Country fixed effects 
Criminalization 
status 
-1.599***  -1.455***     
(0.429)  (0.436)     
First year w/ 
change in 
criminalization 
status 
    -0.756  -0.725 
    (0.604)  (0.615) 
Criminalization 
status in other 
years 
    -1.999***  -1.809*** 
    (0.471)  (0.479) 
US aid (Logged)  0.313***    0.314***   
(0.042)    (0.042)   
US aid as share 
of GDP 
  -1.251    -1.332 
GDP per capita 
(Logged) 
-5.265***  -5.223***  -4.959***  -4.955*** 
(1.096)  (1.118)  (1.105)  (1.127) 
Total population 
(logged) 
-9.152***  -5.131**  -9.073***  -5.053** 
(2.061)  (2.036)  (2.060)  (2.035) 
  (6.036)    (6.031) 
Constant  195.817***  135.763***  192.237***  132.497*** 
  (31.849)  (31.482)  (31.864)  (31.520) 
         
Observations  1,767  1,767  1,766  1,766 
R-squared  0.085  0.052  0.087  0.054 
Number of 
un_ccode 
161  161  161  161 
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3.6.  Robustness tests for Model 4.4 
Cox duration models of time to criminalization 
Hazard Ratios 
 
  Excludes EU countries  Excludes years before 2004  Excludes years before 2005  Excludes countries always 
Tier 1 or Tier 3 
In Report  3.650***  3.726***  3.090***  3.6301*** 
  (1.450)  (1.448)  (1.216)  (1.410) 
First demotion (t-3)  2.149***  2.010**  1.912**  2.047** 
  (0.633)  (0.592)  (0.581)  (0.622) 
First demotion (t-2)  1.541  1.541  1.510  1.645* 
  (0.475)  (0.465)  (0.458)  (0.461) 
First demotion (t-1)  1.360  1.255  1.163  1.322 
  (0.358)  (0.348)  (0.326)  (0.353) 
Share of Women in Parliament  1.021**  1.020**  1.019**  1.019** 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Civil Liberties  0.813***  0.856**  0.882**  0.860** 
  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.055) 
Regional density of 
criminalization 
9.583***  4.853***  4.341***  4.621*** 
  (5.052)  (2.071)  (1.837)  (2.044) 
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification  1.980***  1.435  1.624**  1.673** 
  (0.507)  (0.325)  (0.393)  (0.396) 
Missing Information (t-2)  1.221**  1.225**  1.251***  1.201** 
  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.105)  (0.094) 
Observations  1,291  793  656  1,306 
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -376.9  -363.7  -334.0  -413.0 
subjects  146  138  131  146 
failures  89  85  78  96 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses, all variables lagged by one year unless otherwise noted54 
 
 
3.7.  Sanctions: test for years before sanctions (2001-2003 only) 
Cox duration models of time to criminalization 
Hazard Ratios 
Tier 3  4.096**   
  (2.619)   
Civil Liberties  0.575***  0.629** 
  (0.121)  (0.117) 
Share of Women in Parliament  1.001  0.998 
  (0.024)  (0.024) 
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification  8.006***  7.126*** 
  (3.486)  (3.095) 
Total population (logged)  1.006  0.983 
  (0.130)  (0.133) 
Missing Information (t-2)  0.710  0.751 
  (0.152)  (0.151) 
In Report    1.537 
    (0.784) 
Observations  490  490 
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -83.65  -84.98 
subjects  169  169 
failures  19  19 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses 
All variables lagged by one year unless otherwise noted 
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4. OTHER INFORMATION 
 
4.1. Kaplan Meier survival curve for time to criminalization 
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4.2.  Year First Included in the TIP Report* 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Albania  Georgia  Netherlands  Afghanistan  Belize  Argentina  Algeria  CentralAfRep  Fiji  Congo  Bahamas  Antigua&Barbuda 
Angola  Germany  Nigeria  Armenia  Bolivia  Australia  Chad  Djibouti  PapuaNG  (Brazzaville)  Botswana  Barbados 
Austria  Ghana  Pakistan  EqGuinea  Burundi  Azerbaijan  Libya  Guinea-Bissau    Eritrea  Grenada 
Bahrain  Greece  Philippines  Estonia  Croatia  Chile  Mongolia  Ireland      Iceland  Kiribati 
Bangladesh  Guatemala  Poland  Iran  Cuba  Cyprus  Oman  Jordan      Iraq   
Belarus  Haiti  Qatar  Latvia  Denmark  Ecuador  Syria  Malta      Lesotho   
Belgium  Honduras  Romania  Portugal  Finland  Egypt  Uruguay  Tunisia      Maldives   
Benin  Hungary  Russia  Senegal  Gambia  Guinea  YemenAR        Micronesia   
BosniaandHerz  India  SaudiArabia  Tajikistan  Jamaica  Guyana          Namibia   
Brazil  Indonesia  SierraLeone  Tanzania  Kenya  Madagasgar          Somalia   
Bulgaria  Israel  Singapore    Kuwait  Mauritania          St.Vincent   
BurkinaFaso  Italy  Slovenia    Liberia  NewZealand          Swaziland   
Burma  Japan  South Korea    Malawi  Panama          Trin &Tobago   
Cambodia  Kazakhstan  SouthAfrica    Mauritius  Paraguay          Turkmenistan 
Cameroon  KyrgyzRep  Spain    Mozambique  Peru             
Canada  Laos  SriLanka    Nicaragua               
China  Lebanon  Sudan    Niger               
Colombia  Lithuania  Sweden    Norway               
Congo (Zaire)  Luxembourg  Switzerland    Rwanda               
CostaRica  Macedonia  Thailand    SlovakRep               
Cote DíIvoire  Malaysia  Togo    Surinam               
CzechRep  Mali  Turkey    Uzbekistan               
DomRep  Mexico  UArabEmir    Venezuela               
ElSalvador  Moldova  UK    Zambia               
Ethiopia  Morocco  Uganda    Zimbabwe               
France  Nepal  Ukraine                   
Gabon                       
* Missing data on the dependent variable, so excluded from analysis: Cape Verde, Central African Rep, Comoros, Dominica, Grenada, 
Sao T&P, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Samoa, Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, Marshall Is, Micronesia, St. Kitts &Nevis, 
Vanuatu.  
 
 